The document below is the final
report of the Task Force on Faculty Retirement convened by
the Provost in 2000 to consider the retirement issues listed
in the charge below. The document is awaiting comment and
approval of the Faculty Senate and is being distributed to
the community For Comment. It is anticipated that final decisions
will be made by the President and Provost with a view to
implementation early in fall, 2002. Comments should be directed
to Dr. Barbara Lowery in the Office of the Associate Provost
by October 15, 2002.
Final
Report
Task
Force on Faculty Retirement
University
of Pennsylvania
May
2002
Introduction
A sound retirement plan for faculty
is crucial to the mission and vision of the University of Pennsylvania
as a whole, the individual schools of the University, and the
faculty who have dedicated many years of loyal service to the
University. Prior to January 1, 1994, tenured faculty members
at the University of Pennsylvania were required to retire from
the University no later than the June 30th that followed their
seventieth birthdays. The University's Faculty Voluntary Early
Retirement (FVER) program in effect from 1975 until 1994 was
designed to assist faculty members to prepare for retirement
by providing financial support to permit them to defer making
large withdrawals from their retirement accounts until they
reached the age at which retirement would have been mandatory.
Retirement for tenured faculty
members at colleges and universities is no longer mandatory
at any age. At Penn, the FVER program was replaced by the Faculty
Income Allowance Program (FIAP) in 1994. This latter program
provides benefits, similar to those previously provided by
the FVER program, to tenured faculty members who choose to
retire as early as age sixty-two.
Many universities have been concerned
that the continued low rate of faculty retirement and the corresponding
lack of free tenure positions will both increase their financial
burden and have a deleterious effect on their ability to recruit
younger faculty. However, if too many key faculty retire in
a short time period, it could cause harm to the University's
teaching and research priorities. Thus, retirement of faculty
provides both costs and benefits to Penn. To evaluate how well
the University's current retirement program is meeting its
objectives, the Provost appointed a Task Force to examine the
current retirement plan for faculty. The Task Force was asked
to consider specific areas of concern regarding the current
retirement program for faculty. The charge to the Task Force
by the Provost was as follows:
The Task
Force is being asked to examine several aspects of retirement
of concern to the faculty. They are: the numbers of the faculty
remaining in full-time status past age 70 since uncapping;
the adequacy of the faculty early retirement program (FIAP)
for encouraging faculty to retire as well as the appropriateness
of the early retirement program window (62-68); discontinuing
University Tax Deferred Annuity (TDA) contributions when the
faculty member's TDA has reached a certain level; the new phased
retirement program; a special title for faculty who want to
retire but do not want to use the emeritus title; and policies
and programs for emeritus faculty.
To fulfill its charge, the Retirement
Task Force met throughout the academic years 2000-2002. The
Task Force considered both economic and non-economic issues
involved in looking at the effectiveness of the current retirement
plan and its impact on the decision of faculty to retire. The
Task Force reviewed appropriate literature, evaluated retirement
programs of other universities and sought input from various
groups including retired faculty, faculty near retirement and
the Council of Deans. Studies were also performed by Price
Waterhouse/Coopers to determine the cost-effectiveness of some
of the options considered by the Task Force.
The Task Force report follows
this introduction with its recommendations and a discussion
of the issues outlined in the charge to the Task Force.
Retirement
Task Force Recommendations
After completing its evaluation
of the University of Pennsylvania's faculty retirement program
as outlined in the Introduction of this report, the Task Force
makes the following recommendations.
- The Office of the Associate
Provost should move immediately to establish an Association
of Retired Faculty. This organization would maintain
contact with and develop supportive activities and services
for retired faculty.
- The current Early
Retirement Window (ages 62-68) should be maintained. A
faculty member also should be eligible for an early retirement
incentive under a "rule of 75." Faculty could retire
as early as age 60 (minimum age) with a combination of age and
service at the University of Pennsylvania equaling 75.
- The salary figure used in the
current faculty early retirement plan is the average salary of
a full professor in the retiree's school for the year prior
to retirement. It is recommended that the faculty salary to be
used in the Faculty
Early Retirement window plan should be changed to the faculty
member's own salary or a full professor's average salary in
the faculty member's own school in the year prior to retirement
whichever is higher, subject to a limitation of 200 percent
of the faculty member's own salary as provided by law.
- An additional option should be
added to the phased retirement program allowing standing
faculty and clinician educators in this program to reduce
job duties to 25 percent with a prorata reduction in
salary and a relinquishment of tenure. The age limit for
faculty to participate in this program would be expanded to a
window period from age 55-68. Salary based employee benefits
would be prorated. Medical benefits would be provided on a
cost-sharing basis between the faculty member and the faculty
member's school.
- A one-time
financial planning award (up to $3,000) should be made
available to retirement age faculty (54 and over) to pay for
professional financial planning services that the faculty member
obtains on his or her own behalf.
- Retiring faculty members
should have the option of using or not using
the modifier "Emeritus" or maintaining their
"Professor" title. The same rights and restrictions
to being retired would apply.
- A faculty member who has
committed to retire and who has sabbatical leave credits
should be able to take a "retirement
leave" without having to return to his or her duties
at the University.
- In addition to the retirement
plan information and education provided at the University
level, each School in the University should periodically
discuss with its faculty retirement related issues.
Background
University
faculties are aging. The proportion of full-time faculty age 50
and over has increased from 23.4 percent in 1969 to 51 percent in
1999.1
Between 1977 and 1996, the median age of faculty at
four-year institutions rose from 40 to 48.2 The aging of faculties
has been caused by the general aging of the population, low
turnover rates and low retirement rates.3 Additionally, the ending
of mandatory retirement for faculty means that colleges and
universities can no longer depend on all faculty retiring by age
70. In fact, many studies have shown that since 1994 retirement
rates of faculty have fallen drastically.4
Moreover, it is
forecast that "a sizeable fraction of the cohort of college
and university professors entering their sixties will remain
employed into their mid-seventies."5
Colleges and universities with
an increasing number of faculty in their sixties and seventies
face a number of critical issues related to salaries, benefits,
tenure, hiring new faculty and many others. On the other hand,
if a substantial percentage of the faculty retires in the relatively
near future, colleges and universities will face many other
issues related to accomplishing their educational mission.
It is also essential that colleges and universities focus on
possible ways to utilize the valuable resources of senior or
retired faculty who have dedicated many years of service to
their institution.
The remainder of this report considers
how Penn's current retirement plan, special early retirement
incentives, phased retirement options, and non-economic approaches
are working to achieve Penn's objectives.
Retirement
Plan Objectives
The starting point in any discussion
of Penn's retirement plan for faculty must be a review of how
well the plan meets desired objectives. Penn's faculty retirement
plan appears to have the following objectives:
- Allowing for the retirement
of faculty in an orderly manner that preserves the educational
mission of the University
- Attraction and retention of
key faculty
- Meeting competitive standards
- Keeping the plan within established
cost parameters
- Compliance with legal requirements
- Efficiency of plan design
- Meeting certain income-replacement
ratios
- Social obligations
- Administrative convenience
Penn's approach to meeting its
objectives is through a defined contribution retirement plan,
whereby employer contributions are fixed and employee retirement
benefits are variable depending on their investment performance.
This is in contrast to the defined benefit approach where employee
retirement benefits are known and the employer's cost varies
depending on investment and other actuarial assumptions. The
defined contribution approach is favored by educational and
other nonprofit institutions of faculty. Whether it is possible
to consider a change to a defined benefit plan for future new
faculty is discussed later in this report.
It appears from the Task Force's
investigation that many of the objectives of the Penn faculty
retirement plan are currently being met. The objectives that
need review are the "Allowing for the retirement of faculty
in an orderly manner that preserves the educational mission
of the University" and "Keeping the plan within established
cost parameters."
The remainder of this report considers
how Penn's current retirement plan, special early retirement
incentive, phased retirement options and non-economic measures
are working to achieve Penn's objectives. When appropriate,
suggestions for improving Penn's retirement plan to better
meet its objectives are presented.
Organization
of Retired Faculty
The Task
Force strongly supports the concept of establishing a
University-wide Association of Retired Faculty (ARF) within the
Associate Provost's office with widespread supportive
activities. The establishment of such an organization would
demonstrate the importance of the service and scholarly input
faculty members have contributed to the University over many years
and the opportunities for ongoing service in the Emeritus phase of
faculty life. The following possible activities of such an
organization could include6:
- advocate for various senior
faculty issues such as provision of office space or university-sponsored
long-term care insurance.
- advocate for the University
in the area of fund-raising. Many emeritus faculty, as a
result of years of service to the University and to the Philadelphia
region, are ideally suited for identifying and approaching
individuals and institutions capable of supporting the University
when properly alerted to a specific need.
- through a
questionnaire to all senior faculty (active and emeritus) create a
talent bank of services that they would be willing to provide pro
bono.
In order to staff and support
these activities of the ARF, the University Administration
should:
- develop an Office of Retired
Faculty within the Associate Provost's office, with a staff
person who can commit at least 50 percent of his/her time
to ARF activities. (One possible funding mechanism could
come from the activities of senior and emeritus faculty,
who teach in medical school or university-wide programs such
as the "Freshman Seminar Program" without remuneration.
The University receives tuition funds for these courses and
could fund the office for efforts of its emeritus faculty
for the University.)
- the ARF could develop Senior
Faculty teaching as a marketable resource. For example, in
the Medical School, certain desirable courses in medical/scientific
topics could be available for undergraduates and in distance
learning programs, and a negotiated portion of the revenues
produced would return to the Medical School to support the
Retired Faculty Program.
One-time
Incentive Plans
One approach
to increasing the number of faculty retiring would be to institute
a one-time only incentive plan for faculty over age 70. The number
of faculty over age 70 has grown substantially since the uncapping
of retirement of tenured faculty in 1994. Tables 1-4 below show the demographics of the University's faculty by
age and rank. These tables indicate that in 2000 there were 48
faculty over age 70.7 Also at issue is the number of faculty that
potentially will enter the ranks of over age 70 in the future.
To encourage
faculty over age 70 to retire, the Task Force evaluated the
possibility of a one-time only financial incentive. A one-time
only incentive plan for faculty over the age of 70 could take
one of the following forms that are permitted under the law8:
- a flat dollar amount (e.g.
$100,000 to all who retire);
- a service based benefit (e.g.
$5,000 multiplied by years of service);
- a percentage of salary to all
employees above a certain age;
- a flat dollar amount increase
in pension benefits (e.g. $4200 per month);
- a percentage increase in pension
benefits (e.g. 25%); and
- a plan that imputes years of
service and/or age (e.g. employees over age 55 retiring during
a specific window might receive credit for 5 additional years
of service and/or age).
The Task
Force also considered various one-time only options for improved
life insurance and medical benefits as an inducement for
additional faculty to retire. These options are discussed in a
later section of this report. After a great deal of discussion and
debate about whether the one-time only option would induce
faculty to retire or would actually encourage faculty to delay
retirement, the Task Force decided against recommending this option.
One Task Force member summarized the views of the Task Force as
follows:
I have
two problems with a one-time financial incentive for faculty
members over the age of 70 who now agree to retire. Those faculty
members have already been given one "take-it-now-or-never" choice
that they chose to reject. A second opportunity seems quite
inconsistent with the assertions made to them and to the faculty
members who did accept that first choice. More importantly,
I doubt that it would be possible to convince anyone that such
a retirement incentive is indeed "one-time." At the
present time, many of those who reach the age of 68 decide
to retire rather than continuing for the extra two years required
to make up the FIAP allowance. I believe the possibility of
a "one-time" incentive at a later date would make
the prospect of continuing much more attractive. Moreover,
the possibility of a "one-time" incentive would be
a powerful stimulus for any future faculty member who passed
the age of 70 to hang on until the next offer is made.
Tables
1-4
Faculty Distribution
Age Distribution of Fall Standing
Faculty by Rank (1)
Table
1: All Faculty (1)
Age as of July 1 for each year listed
(2)
*
|
25-29
|
30-34
|
35-39
|
40-44
|
45-49
|
50-54
|
55-59
|
60-64
|
65-69
|
70
|
71 or older
|
Total
(3)
|
2000
|
5
|
132
|
361
|
355
|
345
|
308
|
247
|
170
|
93
|
14
|
34
|
2,064
|
*
|
0.2%
|
6.4%
|
17.5%
|
17.2%
|
16.7%
|
14.9%
|
12.0%
|
8.2%
|
4.5%
|
0.7%
|
1.6%
|
100.0%(3)
|
1999
|
12
|
166
|
410
|
370
|
328
|
290
|
253
|
169
|
91
|
7
|
31
|
2,127
|
*
|
0.6%
|
7.8%
|
19.3%
|
17.4%
|
15.4%
|
13.6%
|
11.9%
|
7.9%
|
4.3%
|
0.3%
|
1.5%
|
100.0%
|
1998
|
16
|
184
|
409
|
386
|
309
|
288
|
252
|
154
|
86
|
11
|
26
|
2,121
|
*
|
0.8%
|
8.7%
|
19.3%
|
18.2%
|
14.6%
|
13.6%
|
11.9%
|
7.3%
|
4.1%
|
0.5%
|
1.2%
|
100.0%
|
1997
|
23
|
193
|
392
|
385
|
305
|
291
|
231
|
147
|
89
|
8
|
20
|
2,084
|
*
|
1.1%
|
9.3%
|
18.8%
|
18.5%
|
14.6%
|
14.0%
|
11.1%
|
7.1%
|
4.3%
|
0.4%
|
1.0%
|
100.0%
|
1996
|
22
|
182
|
366
|
371
|
301
|
277
|
212
|
141
|
83
|
9
|
11
|
1,975
|
*
|
1.1%
|
9.2%
|
18.5%
|
18.8%
|
15.2%
|
14.0%
|
10.7%
|
7.1%
|
4.2%
|
0.5%
|
0.6%
|
100.0%
|
1995
|
21
|
204
|
356
|
356
|
317
|
261
|
213
|
161
|
88
|
14
|
4
|
1,995
|
*
|
1.1%
|
10.2%
|
17.8%
|
17.8%
|
15.9%
|
13.1%
|
10.7%
|
8.1%
|
4.4%
|
0.7%
|
0.2%
|
100.0%
|
1994
|
22
|
203
|
361
|
322
|
297
|
267
|
205
|
167
|
83
|
6
|
0
|
1,933
|
*
|
1.1%
|
10.5%
|
18.7%
|
16.7%
|
15.4%
|
13.8%
|
10.6%
|
8.6%
|
4.3%
|
0.3%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1993
|
30
|
207
|
370
|
325
|
296
|
279
|
180
|
163
|
84
|
0
|
0
|
1,934
|
*
|
1.6%
|
10.7%
|
19.1%
|
16.8%
|
15.3%
|
14.4%
|
9.3%
|
8.4%
|
4.3%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1992
|
23
|
176
|
358
|
318
|
292
|
257
|
176
|
163
|
87
|
0
|
0
|
1,850
|
*
|
1.2%
|
9.5%
|
19.4%
|
17.2%
|
15.8%
|
13.9%
|
9.5%
|
8.8%
|
4.7%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1991
|
22
|
196
|
369
|
346
|
279
|
241
|
191
|
155
|
85
|
0
|
0
|
1,884
|
*
|
1.2%
|
10.4%
|
19.6%
|
18.4%
|
14.8%
|
12.8%
|
10.1%
|
8.2%
|
4.5%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1990
|
29
|
201
|
340
|
337
|
284
|
239
|
194
|
140
|
85
|
1
|
0
|
1,850
|
*
|
1.6%
|
10.9%
|
18.4%
|
18.2%
|
15.4%
|
12.9%
|
10.5%
|
7.6%
|
4.6%
|
0.1%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
Notes:
(1) Excludes faculty with Tenure of Title, Unclassified faculty,
retired faculty, and Emeritus faculty.
(2)
Ages are rounded down to the nearest whole year.
Source:
Derived from the University Payroll System by the Office of
Institutional Research and Analysis
(3)
Totals may not add up to 100% because of rounding.
Table 2: Full
Professor
Age as of July 1 for each
year listed (2)
* |
25-29 |
30-34 |
35-39 |
40-44 |
45-49 |
50-54 |
55-59 |
60-64 |
65-69 |
70 |
71 or older |
Total
(3) |
2000 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
58 |
161 |
221 |
208 |
146 |
88 |
13 |
32 |
938 |
* |
0 |
1.2% |
6.2% |
17.2% |
23.6% |
22.2% |
15.6% |
9.4% |
1.4% |
3.4% |
100.0% |
|
1999 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
78 |
160 |
208 |
210 |
143 |
87 |
7 |
29 |
935 |
* |
0.0% |
0.0% |
1.4% |
8.3% |
17.1% |
22.2% |
22.5% |
15.3% |
9.3% |
0.7% |
3.1% |
100.0% |
1998 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
83 |
161 |
201 |
206 |
133 |
80 |
10 |
23 |
911 |
* |
0.0% |
0.0% |
1.5% |
9.1% |
17.7% |
22.1% |
22.6% |
14.6% |
8.8% |
1.1% |
2.5% |
100.0% |
1997 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
90 |
151 |
208 |
191 |
124 |
84 |
7 |
18 |
885 |
* |
0.0% |
0.0% |
1.4% |
10.2% |
17.1% |
23.5% |
21.6% |
14.0% |
9.5% |
0.8% |
2.0% |
100.0% |
1996 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
93 |
160 |
204 |
177 |
120 |
77 |
8 |
10 |
862 |
* |
0.0% |
0.1% |
1.4% |
10.8% |
18.6% |
23.7% |
20.5% |
13.9% |
8.9% |
0.9% |
1.2% |
100.0% |
1995 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
69 |
169 |
198 |
170 |
143 |
83 |
13 |
4 |
870 |
* |
0.0% |
0.2% |
2.2% |
7.9% |
19.4% |
22.8% |
19.5% |
16.4% |
9.5% |
1.5% |
0.5% |
100.0% |
1994 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
72 |
152 |
202 |
160 |
147 |
78 |
6 |
0 |
842 |
* |
0.0% |
0.2% |
2.7% |
8.6% |
18.1% |
24.0% |
19.0% |
17.5% |
9.3% |
0.7% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1993 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
74 |
153 |
203 |
149 |
143 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
825 |
* |
0.0% |
0.2% |
2.8% |
9.0% |
18.5% |
24.6% |
18.1% |
17.3% |
9.5% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1992 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
77 |
170 |
190 |
145 |
142 |
80 |
0 |
0 |
828 |
* |
0.0% |
0.4% |
2.5% |
9.3% |
20.5% |
22.9% |
17.5% |
17.1% |
9.7% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1991 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
93 |
176 |
178 |
159 |
132 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
844 |
* |
0.0% |
0.2% |
3.0% |
11.0% |
20.9% |
21.1% |
18.8% |
15.6% |
9.4% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1990 |
0 |
3 |
23 |
99 |
179 |
172 |
165 |
118 |
81 |
1 |
0 |
841 |
* |
0.0% |
0.4% |
2.7% |
11.8% |
21.3% |
20.5% |
19.6% |
14.0% |
9.6% |
0.1% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
Notes:
(1) Excludes faculty with Tenure of Title, Unclassified faculty,
retired faculty, and Emeritus faculty.
(2)
Ages are rounded down to the nearest whole year.
Source: Derived from the
University Payroll System by the Office of Institutional
Research and Analysis
(3)
Totals may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Table
3: Associate Professor
Age as of July 1 for each
year listed (2)
|
25-29
|
30-34
|
35-39
|
40-44
|
45-49
|
50-54
|
55-59
|
60-64
|
65-69
|
70
|
71 or older
|
Total (3)
|
2000
|
0
|
9
|
62
|
129
|
125
|
70
|
36
|
23
|
4
|
1
|
1
|
460
|
*
|
0.0%
|
2.0%
|
13.5%
|
28.0%
|
27.2%
|
15.2%
|
7.8%
|
5.0%
|
0.9%
|
0.2%
|
0.2%
|
100.0%
|
1999
|
0
|
8
|
55
|
139
|
105
|
69
|
39
|
24
|
3
|
0
|
1
|
443
|
*
|
0.0%
|
1.8%
|
12.4%
|
31.4%
|
23.7%
|
15.6%
|
8.8%
|
5.4%
|
0.7%
|
0.0%
|
0.2%
|
100.0%
|
1998
|
0
|
9
|
58
|
155
|
95
|
70
|
42
|
19
|
5
|
0
|
3
|
456
|
*
|
0.0%
|
2.0%
|
12.7%
|
34.0%
|
20.8%
|
15.4%
|
9.2%
|
4.2%
|
1.1%
|
0.0%
|
0.7%
|
100.0%
|
1997
|
0
|
15
|
55
|
139
|
110
|
69
|
36
|
21
|
3
|
1
|
2
|
451
|
*
|
0.0%
|
3.3%
|
12.2%
|
30.8%
|
24.4%
|
15.3%
|
8.0%
|
4.7%
|
0.7%
|
0.2%
|
0.4%
|
100.0%
|
1996
|
0
|
6
|
68
|
134
|
110
|
60
|
32
|
18
|
5
|
1
|
1
|
435
|
*
|
0.0%
|
1.4%
|
15.6%
|
30.8%
|
25.3%
|
13.8%
|
7.4%
|
4.1%
|
1.1%
|
0.2%
|
0.2%
|
100.0%
|
1995
|
0
|
12
|
62
|
145
|
114
|
54
|
40
|
16
|
4
|
1
|
0
|
448
|
*
|
0.0%
|
2.7%
|
13.8%
|
32.4%
|
25.4%
|
12.1%
|
8.9%
|
3.6%
|
0.9%
|
0.2%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1994
|
0
|
12
|
73
|
143
|
115
|
57
|
41
|
18
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
463
|
*
|
0.0%
|
2.6%
|
15.8%
|
30.9%
|
24.8%
|
12.3%
|
8.9%
|
3.9%
|
0.9%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1993
|
0
|
8
|
83
|
141
|
111
|
69
|
29
|
17
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
463
|
*
|
0.0%
|
1.7%
|
17.9%
|
30.5%
|
24.0%
|
14.9%
|
6.3%
|
3.7%
|
1.1%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1992
|
0
|
14
|
93
|
143
|
102
|
63
|
30
|
17
|
7
|
0
|
0
|
469
|
*
|
0.0%
|
3.0%
|
19.8%
|
30.5%
|
21.7%
|
13.4%
|
6.4%
|
3.6%
|
1.5%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1991
|
0
|
17
|
98
|
156
|
87
|
61
|
28
|
22
|
6
|
0
|
0
|
475
|
*
|
0.0%
|
3.6%
|
20.6%
|
32.8%
|
18.3%
|
12.8%
|
5.9%
|
4.6%
|
1.3%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
1990
|
0
|
19
|
92
|
151
|
87
|
62
|
27
|
21
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
463
|
*
|
0.0%
|
4.1%
|
19.9%
|
32.6%
|
18.8%
|
13.4%
|
5.8%
|
4.5%
|
0.9%
|
0.0%
|
0.0%
|
100.0%
|
Notes: (1) Excludes faculty with Tenure of Title, Unclassified
faculty, retired faculty, and Emeritus faculty.
(2) Ages are rounded down to the nearest whole year.
Source:
Derived from the University Payroll System by the Office of
Institutional Research and Analysis
(3) Totals may not add up to 100% because of rounding.
TABLE
4: Assistant Professor
Age as of July 1 for each year listed (2)
* |
25-29 |
30-34 |
35-39 |
40-44 |
45-49 |
50-54 |
55-59 |
60-64 |
65-69 |
70 |
71 or older |
Total |
2000 |
5 |
123 |
288 |
168 |
59 |
17 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
666 |
* |
0.8% |
18.5% |
43.2% |
25.2% |
8.9% |
2.6% |
0.5% |
0.2% |
0.2% |
0.0% |
0.2% |
100.0% |
1999 |
12 |
158 |
342 |
153 |
63 |
13 |
4 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
749 |
* |
1.6% |
21.1% |
45.7% |
20.4% |
8.4% |
1.7% |
0.5% |
0.3% |
0.1% |
0.0% |
0.1% |
100.0% |
1998 |
16 |
175 |
337 |
148 |
53 |
17 |
4 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
754 |
* |
2.1% |
23.2% |
44.7% |
19.6% |
7.0% |
2.3% |
0.5% |
0.3% |
0.1% |
0.1% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1997 |
23 |
178 |
325 |
156 |
44 |
14 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
748 |
* |
3.1% |
23.8% |
43.4% |
20.9% |
5.9% |
1.9% |
0.5% |
0.3% |
0.3% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1996 |
22 |
175 |
286 |
144 |
31 |
13 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
678 |
* |
3.2% |
25.8% |
42.2% |
21.2% |
4.6% |
1.9% |
0.4% |
0.4% |
0.1% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1995 |
21 |
190 |
275 |
142 |
34 |
9 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
677 |
* |
3.1% |
28.1% |
40.6% |
21.0% |
5.0% |
1.3% |
0.4% |
0.3% |
0.1% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1994 |
22 |
189 |
265 |
107 |
30 |
8 |
4 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
628 |
* |
3.5% |
30.1% |
42.2% |
17.0% |
4.8% |
1.3% |
0.6% |
0.3% |
0.2% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1993 |
30 |
197 |
264 |
110 |
32 |
7 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
646 |
* |
4.6% |
30.5% |
40.9% |
17.0% |
5.0% |
1.1% |
0.3% |
0.5% |
0.2% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1992 |
23 |
159 |
244 |
98 |
20 |
4 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
553 |
* |
4.2% |
28.8% |
44.1% |
17.7% |
3.6% |
0.7% |
0.2% |
0.7% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1991 |
22 |
177 |
246 |
97 |
16 |
2 |
4 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
565 |
* |
3.9% |
31.3% |
43.5% |
17.2% |
2.8% |
0.4% |
0.7% |
0.2% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
1990 |
29 |
179 |
225 |
87 |
18 |
5 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
546 |
* |
5.3% |
32.8% |
41.2% |
15.9% |
3.3% |
0.9% |
0.4% |
0.2% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
100.0% |
Notes:
(1) Excludes faculty with Tenure of Title, Unclassified faculty,
retired faculty, and Emeritus faculty.
(2) Ages are rounded down to
the nearest whole year.
Source: Derived from the University Payroll System by the
Office of Institutional Research and Analysis
(3)
Totals may not add up to 100% because of rounding.
Early
Retirement Window Period
To provide the University and
faculty members greater flexibility, the Task Force considered
permitting early retirement at age 55 with 15 years of service.
From 1975 to 1996, under the Faculty Voluntary Early Retirement
(FVER) plan, faculty could retire as early as age 55 with at
least 15 years of service at the University of Pennsylvania.
With the introduction of the Faculty Income Allowance Plan
(FIAP) in 1996, the early retirement age was raised from age
55 to age 62. The Task Force thought that allowing early retirement
of faculty as early as age 55 with appropriate service requirements
would give retiring faculty a chance to think about another
career opportunity. When a faculty member reaches the current
earliest retirement age (62), there is more of a tendency to "hang
on" until the end of the eligibility period for the Faculty
Income Allowance Plan.
One argument against moving the
early retirement to as low as age 55 is that the University
may lose some faculty that various Schools would like to retain.
Also, the cost of providing medical benefits for the faculty
member and his or her dependents could possibly offset any
salary savings at the School level. Moreover, as pointed out
in a later part of this report, salary savings in hiring younger
faculty are often not as great as assumed.
One Task Force member expressed
his concern for lowering the early retirement age as follows:
A reduction
of the beginning of the retirement window to age 55 will shift
part of the cost of stimulating the retirement of unproductive
not-quite-senior faculty members from the School to the University.
The logic for this shift is not apparent to me. Worse yet,
it provides an extra incentive for those very productive not-quite-senior
faculty members to look elsewhere. If we fail to keep them,
the University will have helped the raiding institution with
its recruitment package. If we succeed in retaining them, the
retaining School will almost certainly have to increase the
size of the package needed to retain them. This appears to
me to be an almost classic lose-lose situation.
The Task Force recommends that
the early retirement window period remain at ages 62-68. To
allow some flexibility for long service faculty or for faculty
hired in mid-or-late career, the Task Force recommends enacting
a rule of 75. The "Rule of 75" would allow a faculty
member with a combination of age and service equaling 75 to
retire. This plan would have a minimum retirement age of 60.
Alternative
New Early Retirement Approach
Declining Benefit Approach
The Task Force reviewed a new
early retirement program modeled somewhat after the retirement
program of the University of Chicago. Under the Chicago approach,
the rate of faculty retirements is substantially greater than
that of the University of Pennsylvania. The Chicago plan provides
greater retirement incentives the earlier the faculty member
retires. The Task Force considered a bonus program for faculty
who retire after age 55 and before age 70 with at least 15
years of service. The bonus would be calculated by multiplying
the bonus factor in the table below by the salary of the faculty
member in the year prior to retirement or the average salary
of the faculty member over the last two or three years prior
to retirement. If the average salary of a full professor in
the faculty member's school during this period is higher, it
would be the salary used in the calculation. Only base salary
would be eligible for this retirement bonus.
Retirement
Bonus Program
Age
at Retirement
|
55-58
|
59-61
|
62-65
|
66-68
|
69
|
Bonus
Factor
|
2.0
|
1.8
|
1.4
|
1.0
|
.8
|
A faculty
member who makes an irrevocable commitment to retire at least one
year in advance of his or her retirement age would be entitled to
a bonus. For example, a faculty member who plans to retire at age
57 whose average salary over the three years (if this is the
measure used) prior to retirement was $80,000 would receive a
retirement bonus of $160,000. Bonus payments could be made either
in a lump sum or over a period of years. In the event of the death
of a faculty member before all bonus payments are made, any
remaining payments will be paid to his or her designated
beneficiary. If a faculty member who has elected to retire dies
prior to retirement, no bonus would be paid to the faculty
member's beneficiary. Under this circumstance, the faculty
member would be covered by Penn's life insurance program and his
or her beneficiary would receive the life insurance policy
proceeds.
Several issues were raised in
Task Force discussions. Would the faculty who decided to take
advantage of this plan be the very faculty various schools
would like to retain? Would faculty reaching the end of the
eligibility period elect to continue rather then retire since
the bonus they would receive under the plan could fairly quickly
be replaced by their regular faculty salary?
Additionally, in discussions with
the University of Chicago it appears that the enhanced health
insurance benefit provided in the retirement incentive plan
had more to do with faculty retiring than the retirement bonus
plan. The health incentive by Chicago was to pay lifetime premiums
for each participating faculty member and his or her spouse
or University approved domestic partner for University sponsored
retiree health insurance that supplements Medicare.
The Chicago retirement incentive
package also included a $3,000 financial planning benefit for
those faculty who decided to retire early. After analysis of
the issues involved in the declining benefit approach, the
Task Force recommends that the University continue its current
approach to providing early retirement incentives. As mentioned
subsequently in this report, possible enhanced health insurance
options and a financial planning benefit were examined as potential
enhancements to the current faculty early retirement arrangement.
Ability
to Reduce Job Duties to 25 Percent
Under the current University phased-retirement
program, a faculty member in anticipation of retirement may
reduce his or her duties up to 50 percent of their full workload
at a proportionately reduced salary. The faculty member must
also agree to retire no later than six years after entering
into the phased retirement program. The Task Force, the Council
of Deans, and several faculty interviewed favor adding an additional
option to the phased-retirement program. This would allow a
faculty member to keep an attachment to the University or perhaps
teach a special course where the faculty member has a particular
expertise. The proposal would allow a faculty member to reduce
his or her duties to 25 percent with a proportionate reduction
in salary and a surrender of tenure. The maximum period before
full retirement would be six years. Employee benefits related
to salary would be reduced proportionately. Medical benefits
would be on a cost-sharing basis between the faculty member
and faculty member's school. The Task Force believes adding
this 25 percent option would provide increased flexibility
to the faculty and to the individual schools of the University.
Additional
Health Care and Life Insurance Plan Improvements
Throughout the Task Force deliberations,
the issue of providing improvements to the current University
health insurance program for retirees was deemed important
to encourage additional faculty to retire. The fear of continuing
escalation of health care costs during retirement appears to
prevent some faculty from retiring.
The current University plan calls
for retired employees to cost share on the same basis as active
employees until age 65 at which time they are eligible for
Medicare. At age 65, the retiree and the University share in
the cost of a Medicare Supplement plan that covers many of
the gaps not covered by Medicare.
At one time, health insurance
was totally paid for by the University for a retiree and his
or her family. This was a powerful incentive for employees
to retire. This practice changed when the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) issued FASB 106. This standard required
retiree health costs to be recognized as an employer liability.
In response to reducing this future liability, the University
instituted a cost sharing arrangement for retirees.
The Task Force asked the Human
Resources division to calculate the cost to the University
of various options ranging from freezing the cost to the retiree
of health insurance for the life of the participant, to freezing
the retiree's cost for a period of two or five years.
Of the options considered, the
Task Force favored an approach that would freeze retiree contributions
at the point of retirement for a period of five years. Exhibit
1 below illustrates the potential additional costs to the University.
It should again be mentioned that
there would be offsetting savings to the University in not
having to provide pension contributions and substantially reducing
the amount contributed for life insurance coverage for those
induced to retire.
Since many of the issues required
actuarial and other key assumptions to make any meaningful
judgments, Price Waterhouse/Coopers (PWC) was hired to work
with the University on possible changes to the Faculty Income
Allowance Plan (FIAP) that would better meet the objectives
of the University. The University's objectives were to increase
the number of retirements among standing faculty in general
and among those over age 70 in particular. The main thrust
of PWC's work, focused primarily on the financial implications
of the benefit features of the FIAP plan. Many different scenarios
were modeled providing enhanced medical benefits and life insurance
options to faculty in the age 62-68 group and the over 70 age
group. PWC's findings were reviewed with various senior financial
and other officials at the University. The costs associated
with an enhanced medical and life insurance program were considered
to be too great at this time to change the existing arrangement.
This result was caused by the exploding costs of health care,
less savings than anticipated in hiring replacement faculty
and the increase that would be necessary to the employee benefits
rate.
The Task Force feels strongly
that this area should be periodically evaluated if conditions
change in the environment.
Exhibit
1
Medical
Cost Projections Assuming 15% Annual Cost Increases Under the
Faculty Income Allowance
A - Retiree's Share Frozen as
of 6/30/02
B - Retiree's Share Not Frozen
*
|
Average
Annual Cost
Per/Retiree*
|
Total
Cost:**
63 FIAP Participants
|
Total
Cost:
100 FIAP Participants
|
Plan Year Ending
6/30/02
|
A
|
B
|
A
|
B
|
A
|
B
|
Total Cost
|
$5,757
|
$
5,757
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Retiree's Share
|
1,799
|
1,799
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
University's Share
|
3,958
|
3,958
|
$249,354
|
$249,354
|
$395,800
|
$395,800
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
6/30/03
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Total Cost
|
6,621
|
6,621
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Retiree's Share
|
1,799
|
2,069
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
University's Share
|
4,822
|
4,552
|
$303,786
|
$286,776
|
$482,200
|
$455,200
|
Add'l University Cost
due to Freeze
|
270
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
6/30/04
|
*
|
* *
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Total Cost
|
$7,614
|
$7,614
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Retiree's Share
|
1,799
|
2,379
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
University's Share
|
5,815
|
5,235
|
$366,345
|
$329,805
|
$581,500
|
$523,500
|
Add'l University Cost
due to Freeze
|
580
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
6/30/05
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Total Cost
|
$8,756
|
$8,756
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Retiree's Share
|
1,799
|
2,736
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
University's Share
|
6,957
|
6,020
|
$438,291
|
$379,260
|
$695,700
|
$602,000
|
Add'l University Cost
due to Freeze
|
937
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
6/30/06
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Total Cost
|
$10,069
|
$10,069
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
Retiree's Share
|
1,799
|
3,146
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
University's Share
|
8,270
|
6,923
|
$521,010
|
$436,149
|
$827,000
|
$692,300
|
Add'l University Cost
due to Freeze
|
1,347
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
*
|
* Based on the average cost
of current elections of 63 FIAP participants, 95% of whom are in
Blue Cross/Blue Shield 65 Special. The rest are in Plan 100 and
PENNCare because they are below age 65. The above projected costs
will be affected by the age of FIAP participants because the average
cost of Plan 100 and PENNCare is twice the cost of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield 65 Special.
** Of the 63 currently collecting, 36 are under the previous
Faculty Voluntary Early Retirement (FVER) program and 27 under the
current Faculty Income Allowance Plan (FIAP). There are currently
143 faculty between the ages of 62-65 with 15 years of service.
Providing
for Personal Financial Planning Support
The Task Force supports the concept
of providing some financial support for personal financial
planning services for those faculty members of retirement age
(deemed to be age 54 and over). There appears to be a major
need to obtain objective information regarding retirement and
other financial planning matters. This benefit might encourage
some faculty to retire if they can determine that they are
able to have a comfortable retirement. Other faculty would
be able to have a financial planning professional put them
on the correct path to a future retirement. The Task Force
proposes that the University would reimburse a faculty member
up to $3,000 to pay for financial planning advice prior to
retirement. The reimbursable fees could be restricted, if thought
appropriate, to payments to Certified Financial Planners (CFPs),
accountants or attorneys.
Use
of "Emeritus" Title
The Task Force was asked to review
the question concerning faculty who may wish to retire but
do not want to use the "emeritus" title. The Task
Force explored some of the reasons certain members of the faculty
would like to either have a title other than "emeritus" or
to be permitted to retire and still carry a "professor" title.
Faculty pointed out that the "emeritus" title at
one time was considered an honor. Today, however, basically
everyone who retires receives the "emeritus" title,
so it no longer means as much as it did in the past. In fact,
those same faculty expressed concern that instead of being
an honor, the "emeritus" title now conveys "old", "washed
up" or "not current in your field." Some faculty
also believe the "emeritus" title puts one at a disadvantage
when applying for research grants, and therefore the title
is a disincentive to retire.
The Task Force considered the
possibility of other titles such as "Senior Professor" or "Distinguished
Professor." After much debate, the Task Force concluded
that some of the potential new titles would quickly be seen
to be equivalent to the "emeritus" title.
The Task Force recommends, subject
to necessary approvals, if any, that retiring faculty be permitted
to choose whether to use the modifier "emeritus" or
to continue to use a "professor" title. Any restrictions
of limitations that apply to "emeritus" status would
continue to apply to those retiring faculty using a "professor" title.
Policy
Regarding Terminal Sabbaticals
The current University policy
on "Sabbatical Leaves" requires a faculty member
to return to his or her duties for at least one year after
a Sabbatical Leave. It appears this policy in practice varies
among Schools of the University when a faculty member takes
a "Sabbatical Leave" just prior to retirement. In
some instances, certain Schools of the University consider
a "Sabbatical Leave" prior to retirement a "terminal
sabbatical" with no need to return while in other cases
faculty are required to return.
The Task Force favors that a policy
be established whereby faculty members who have accumulated
leave credits and take a "Sabbatical Leave" just
prior to retirement would not have to return to their normal
duties at the University. This leave policy would have to have
another name, perhaps a "Retirement Leave" rather
than the more common "Terminal Leave." The Task Force
thinks this type of leave policy might encourage some eligible
faculty to retire.
The Task Force considered the
possibility of discontinuing its University retirement contributions
under certain conditions. This is a concept utilized at Yale
University. The plan at Yale stops university retirement contributions
after the goals of the plan have been met. The goal is determined
by an income replacement model.
One issue under Penn's current
defined contribution plan when two faculty members with equal
salary and length of service could have entirely different
retirement income funds accumulated based on their investment
results. Under this case situation, one faculty member would
have contributions continue to his or her retirement fund while
the other "wiser" investor would not receive any
contributions. Given the stock market situation of the last
few years, the Task Force felt now was not the time to consider
such an option. However, it is an option that should be periodically
reviewed as circumstances warrant.
Providing
Retirement Education
The Task Force recognizes that
the University provides substantial retirement information
and education to the faculty on a uniform basis. In addition,
the Task Force recommends that each school develop policies
to discuss retirement-related issues with their faculty on
a regular basis. Each school also should supplement retirement
and other financial planning information already provided to
its faculty as appropriate. The goal of this recommendation
is to enable more faculty to think about and adequately plan
for their retirement.
Conclusion
A major issue
faces the University of Pennsylvania since the elimination
of a mandatory retirement age in 1994 for tenured faculty.
This development raises many issues, both financial and academic.
To address the above concerns, the Provost of the University
appointed a Task Force to evaluate the effectiveness of the
retirement incentive plan currently in effect. The Task Force
deliberated, commissioned studies, and recommended a number
of changes that were enumerated in this report. While these
recommendations may increase the number of faculty retiring
somewhat, to meet the long-term issues and to keep the University
vibrant and to assure its world-class status, some bold new
approaches may be needed. Perhaps the existing defined contribution
plan needs revamping into some hybrid plan consisting of the
best features of both defined benefit and defined contribution
plans, if not for existing faculty, then perhaps for newly
hired faculty. Innovative approaches to budgeting should be
considered so that changes that make sense overall are not
enacted because of impact on schools or the University in an
uneven manner.
Health care
costs must be controlled as they inhibit what can be accomplished
in the retirement and other areas. In almost any discussion
of substance, health care costs limit constructive changes
that could benefit not just faculty but all other University
constituencies as well.
Members
of the Task Force on Faculty Retirement
Regina
Austin
Leny Bader
Dorothy Cheney
Ira Cohen
Jack Heuer
Barbara Lowery
Rob Roy MacGregor
Ann O'Sullivan
Carl Polsky
Jerry Rosenbloom, Chair
Elizabeth Salasko
Gail Smith
Beth Soldo
Walter
Wales
Appendices
are available upon request from the Office of the Associate
provost, 118 College Hall/6303 or by e-mail, simonr@pobox.upenn.edu
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1 Raymond J. Schmierer,
from a presentation entitled, To Retire or Not: Faculty Decisions
and Institutional Incentives. Information obtained from a joint
survey sponsored by AAUP, ACE, CUPA-HR, NACUBO, and TIAA-CREF
Institute, 2001.
2 Orley
Ashenfelter and David Card, "Did the Elimination of Mandatory
Retirement Affect Faculty Retirement Flows?" NBER Working
Paper 8378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
MA, 2001, p. 6.
3 IBID
4 IBID
5 Ronald G.
Ehrenberg and Michael J. Rizzo, "Faculty Retirement Policies
after the End of Mandatory Retirement," TIAA-CREF
Institute Issue, no. 69, October 2001, p. 2.
6 The points
mentioned above are taken directly (with slight modification) from
the excellent University of Pennsylvania Medical School, Faculty
2000 Project: Working Group on the Senior Faculty. Howard Goldfine,
Ph.D. and Rob Roy MacGregor, M.D. served as co-chairs. See Appendix
1 for additional information.
7 See
Appendix 2 for additional demographic information on the
University of Pennsylvania faculty.
8
See Appendix 3.
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