

Constructing Responsibility:

Knowledge, Ethics and Individual Choice

Introduction

I'm Drew Faust of the Department of History here at Penn, and as chair of the Inaugural Committee of faculty, staff, and students, it is my honor to welcome you to this opening event in our celebration of the Inauguration of Judith Rodin.

As the Inaugural Committee began meeting last spring to discuss plans for these festivities, we decided we wanted to start the proceedings with an occasion that would represent what universities are most essentially about: the discovery and exchange of ideas. This symposium is designed to do exactly that. We hope it will display both the timeless and timely quality of learning, because we have chosen a topic that concerned the ancient philosophers who came to know it as the problem of the "freedom of the will" and it still remains an issue in the news almost every day. The question of individual responsibility also cuts across disciplines and fields. It is at once scholarly and professional, abstract and applied, and thus I think it will enable us to demonstrate for you some of the interdisciplinarity that we cherish as one of Penn's hallmarks. We are pleased as well that these issues are among those that engaged our new president in her own scholarly work in psychology; thus we see this symposium as a particularly appropriate way to welcome her to Penn as a distinguished scholar as well as our new president.

So it is my privilege to welcome our visitors, our trustees, our own faculty, staff and

students, and, in particular, to welcome Judith Rodin to the University of Pennsylvania for her inauguration.

Judith Rodin: Thank you, Drew. It's a wonderful moment to begin a celebration of the University of Pennsylvania by celebrating its faculty and its scholarship. This is especially significant for me, because, as Drew said, the topic is one in which I have spent a considerable amount of my own time investigating, thinking, worrying through with my students—and because some of the members of the panel represent my oldest friends. So it is a homecoming to Penn and a welcoming in a variety of ways. It speaks to all of us, and to the fact that research and scholarship is at the heart of this university—particularly the kind of interdisciplinary scholarship that Penn does best. I want to say thank you to Drew and the wonderful committee that worked with her, and thank you to Art Caplan for what I know will be an astonishing seminar.

Welcome to all our guests.

Dr. Faust: In the interest of time and because of the extensive lists of achievements of all our panelists here, we are not going to engage in lengthy introductions. You can find, on the back of your program, information about all of the participants. I simply want now to introduce the convenor of our panel, who is Dr. Arthur Caplan, Trustee Professor of Bioethics, and he will now orchestrate our topic.

Dr. Caplan: Thank you, Drew. It's a pleasure to be here on this joyous occasion. Judith Rodin doesn't know it but many, many years ago when she was just about finishing her graduate work at Columbia University, I was starting my graduate work at Columbia University, and I took a course with one of her mentors at the time, a professor by the name of Stanley Schachter.

I didn't do particularly well in that course, but I heard a lot about Judith's achievements and one source I had—an honest source, unlike turning to colleagues and mentors—was that my wife had a job as a part-time assistant secretary in the psychology department at Columbia at that time. So I really got the low down on people. Only the nicest things were said about Judith Rodin. We are lucky to have her in our midst and I'm looking forward to the next two days as we celebrate this wonderful beginning of a new era here at Penn.

I was asked some time ago to think about a topic that we might have to bridge the disciplines and professions of this great university; that would be able to engage people from different perspectives and different points of view. I thought a bit about some of the things that Judith Rodin has been looking at in her career, factors that shape and mold human behavior. As a leading authority and scholar on eating disorders, her work has had both theoretical and applied implications. It's been both pioneering and practical. It's been heuristic; that is, inspirational to others to further

At the University Museum on Thursday, October 20, a faculty symposium marking the inauguration of President Judith Rodin was convened by Dr. Caplan, right. Chairing the Inaugural Committee was Dr. Faust, left. Panelists in between are (left to right) Dr. Dunfee, Dr. Seligman, Dr. Fox and Dr. Anderson.



Photos by Mark Garvin



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research, and at the same time seminal, and viewed as definitive of what we do and don't know about the causes, motives, and factors that lead people to behave in certain ways with respect to food and eating.

Professor Rodin believes that Penn can and ought to be a place where valuable debate and discussion can cross disciplinary lines and professional areas. She sees this university as a place where new ideas can emerge and contribute to broad social and public policy debate. That spirit, I hope, will animate our dialogue here today. It's out of an interest and respect for her work, that when I thought, "Well, what theme ought we try to focus on?" I began to see that a superb place to watch how the University can make a contribution to public discourse, in a timely manner, is to look at this much-contested, much-debated, and widely discussed concept of *responsibility*.

Ours is a society that seems to be struggling very hard to try and construct for itself a notion of responsibility. We are, in some ways, almost obsessed with this idea. At the time I thought that we would take a theme like "Constructing Responsibility" as the core of our address, I didn't realize how prescient I was about the dominance that this concept was going to be taking on in the culture at the time we finally got to hold the actual symposium.

Last night, I'm drifting off to sleep, to the dulcet tones and stern visage of Tom Brokaw, public moralist, and Tom Brokaw says to me that we're going to do a special this week on NBC Television, all week long, on something he called the "excuse abuse"; the abuse of excuses in our society. Are we spending too much time trying to impute behavior, that some view as criminal or antisocial, to factors and forces that in some way seem stretched when we say it's due to child upbringing or it's due to a bad social environment or it was something a person was driven to by the ingestion of Milk Duds or Jujubes or who knows what?

Not long before that momentous interlude with Mr. Brokaw, I was wandering through a bookstore in Philadelphia and I came across a volume by Alan Dershowitz, *The Responsibility Cop Out*, and Professor Dershowitz tells us we really have to start thinking harder in the law about the kinds of defenses people are mounting, claiming all sorts of exculpations due to upbringing and background and so on. I noticed, too, in the newspaper this week, that he explained to reporters that he had written that book before agreeing to go on the O.J. Simpson defense team.

Everywhere you look in our society, people are struggling to come to grips with what concept of responsibility is appropriate in different areas and sectors of human endeavor: in law, in medicine, in public policy, in architecture, in business. In areas such as medicine and the law, battles are raging now about the role of individual responsibility in the allocation of resources. When you look and see people saying it's wrong to offer an organ transplant to a person who's committed serious crimes, or even to someone who's *alleged* to have committed serious crimes, these are examples of trying to struggle, and struggle hard, with the question

of how we reward or hold culpable, or allocate scarce resources to those who engage in behavior that some might see as culpable, for which people might be held "responsible," and others might say is irrelevant for reasons having to do with the fact that the causal chain of events between a particular behavior or particular character type is so long and convoluted that it's impossible to impute any sense of personal responsibility for what we do, who we are, and what we become.

In business, in the media, there are ongoing discussions about the applicability of the concept of responsibility to abstract entities such as the corporation or the network. I remember not too long ago there was a debate about whether or not NBC News had acted inappropriately in deciding to rig a car to explode to show a safety problem with a particular vehicle. Well, can NBC News be responsible or viewed as an entity that is responsible for anything? Is it possible to look at anything beyond the level of the *person* as having fair application to the concept of responsibility?

It seems to me that moral tales and stories about personal responsibility are all around us, from arguments about President Clinton's character to evaluations of the verdicts in the trials of the Menendez brothers, the Bobbitts, Rodney King, to the liability of Exxon for the Alaska oil spill, movies such as *Quiz Show*, *Jurassic Park* and *Schindler's List* which raise questions about personal responsibility and the relevance of character and virtue and vice and making assessments of how people live and what we should hold them to account for.

If we look at the enormous shifts that have taken place in attitudes about cigarette smoking—a revolution in my own lifetime about personal responsibility, about holding people to account for what used to be viewed as an exciting, dramatic habit: the stuff of movie-star fame. Now those who engage in this behavior are condemned to a life of public condemnation, perhaps put in the stocks should they decide to engage in something like smoking in a restaurant.

An enormous shift in attitude in this culture about personal responsibility with respect to things such as smoking, the use of contra-

ceptives, the engagement in sexual behavior of certain sorts. We are struggling very hard to try and figure out exactly what we want to do both in public and private with respect to personal responsibility.

Why this struggle? Why are we so consumed right now with trying to understand how to construct responsibility and work it into our public policy, work it into our spiritual lives, work it into our discussions at the family dinner table? At this point in time in our culture, it is not clear to me why this concept has come to the fore in such a strong manner and fashion.

What is clear to me is that the social, cultural, and historical biases and presumptions that we as Americans bring to our talk of individual and personal responsibility, have been little examined. Despite all the talk, there is little in the way in current, public debate to reflect thinking in psychology, in social psychology, philosophy, biology, anthropology, decision theory, or the other social sciences, to better inform this dialogue and debate.

Are the biases and presuppositions that can be identified in how we talk about responsibility based upon empirical study of either human or animal behavior?

Is there empirical data or historical interpretation that would help advance what we think?

Is there some way to improve what is sometimes a rather stunted and ill-informed debate by information from the professions about what conduct and character mean in terms of how we assess the behavior of particular individuals?

Is skepticism warranted about America's ability as a society to take responsibility seriously and to do something about it?

That's a menu of questions that I've asked this distinguished panel to try and grapple with. I don't expect them to answer all of them today, but I think we're going to get an exciting and vigorous debate about them. The first of the distinguished panelists is Elijah Anderson, the Charles and William L. Day Professor of Social Sciences here at the University.

After he speaks, I'm going to ask each of the panelists to come to the lectern, then we'll turn for some dialogue and debate amongst them.

About the Panelists

Elijah Anderson, Charles and William L. Day Professor of Social Sciences, the School of Arts and Sciences, and Associate Director of Center for Urban Ethnography; author of *Streetwise: Race, Class and Change in an Urban Community* and other books.

Arthur L. Caplan, Trustee Professor of Bioethics and Director of Center for Bioethics, School of Medicine; syndicated column "A Question of Ethics"; author of *If I Were a Rich Man, I Could Buy a Pancreas and Other Essays on Medical Ethics; Moral Matters* and other works.

Thomas W. Dunfee, Professor of Legal Studies and Joseph Kolodny Professor of Social Responsibility, Wharton School; co-author of *Modern Business Law; Business and Its Legal Environment; Business Ethics: Japan and the Global Economy* and other books.

Drew G. Faust, Annenberg Professor of History, the School of Arts and Sciences; winner of the Lindback Award, 1982; and of the Charles Sydnor, Jules Landry and Society of Early American Historians prizes for her *James Henry Hammond and the Old South*.

Renée C. Fox, Annenberg Professor of the Social Sciences, the School of Arts and Sciences; winner of the Lindback Award, 1989; co-author of *Spare Parts: Organ Transplantation in American Society* and other works.

Martin E. P. Seligman, Robert and Arlene Kogod Term Professor of Psychology, the School of Arts and Sciences; author of *Learned Optimism* and *What You Can Change and What You Can't*, among other works.

Elijah Anderson: *Responsibility: Where Does It Lie?*

So many Americans presently fail to appreciate the difficulties, the stress, and the sheer dangers which attend life in the inner city. Raising children in this environment is especially problematic. A mother on her own often feels she must be constantly on guard and exhibit a great deal of determination. A single mother of four boys, three of whom are grown, explains:

It really is pretty bad around here. There's quite a few grandmothers taking care of kids. They mothers out here on crack. There's quite a few of 'em. The drugs are terrible.

Now I got a 15-year-old boy, and I do everything I can to keep him straight. 'Cause they all on the corner. You can't say you not in it 'cause we in a bad area. They [drug dealers and users] be all on the corner. They be sittin' in front of apartments takin' the crack. And constantly, every day, I have to stay on 'em and make sure everything's O.K. Which is real bad, I never seen it this bad. And I been around here since '81, and I never seen it this bad.

At nights they be roamin' up and down the streets, and they be droppin' the caps [used crack vials] all in front of your door. And when the kids out there playin', you gotta like sweep 'em up.

It's harder for me now to try to keep my 15-year-old under control. Right now, he likes to do auto mechanics, hook up radios in people's cars. And long as I keep 'im interested in that, I'm O.K.

But it's not a day that goes by that I'm not in fear. 'Cause right now, he got friends that's sellin' it [drugs]. They, you know, got a whole lot of money and stuff.

And I get him to come and mop floors [she works as a part-time janitor] and I give him a few dollars. I say, "As long as you got a roof over yo' head, son, don't worry about nothin' else."

It's just a constant struggle tryin' to raise yo' kids in this time. It's very hard. They [boys on the street] say to him, "Man, why you got to go in the house?" And they keep sittin' right on the stoop. If he go somewhere, I got to know where he's at and who he's with. And they be tellin' him....He say, "No man, I got to stay on these steps. I don't want no problem with my mama!"

Now I been a single parent for 15 years. So far, I don't have any problems. I have four sons. I got just the one that's not grown, the 15-year-old. Everyone else is grown. My oldest is 35. I'm tryin'. Not that easy. I got just one more, now. Then I'll be all right. If I need help, the older ones'll help me.

Most of the time, I keep track myself. I told him I'll kill him if I catch him out here sellin' [drugs]. And I know most of the drug dealers. He better not. I gon' hurt him. They better not give him nothin' [drugs or money]. He better not do nothin' for them. I tell him, "I know some of your friends are dealers. [You can] speak to 'em, but don't let me catch you hangin' on the corner. I done struggled too

hard to try to take care of you. I'm not gon' let you throw your life away."

When me and my husband separated in '79, I figured I had to do it. He was out there drivin' trucks and never home. I had to teach my kids how to play ball and this and that. I said, "If I have to be a single parent, I'll do it."

It used to be the gangs, and you fought 'em, and it was over. But now if you fight somebody, they may come back and kill you. It's a whole lot different now. You got to be street smart to get along. My boy doesn't like to fight. I took him out of school, put him in a home course. The staff does what it wants to. Just work for a pay check.

You tell the kid, now you can't pick their friends, so you do what you can. I try to tell mine, "You gon' be out there with the bad [street kids], you can't do what they do. You got to use your own mind." Every day, if I don't get up and say a prayer, I can't make it. I can't make it. I watch him closely. If he go somewhere, I have to know where he at. And when I leave him, or if he go to them girlfriends' houses, I tell the parents, "If you not responsible, he can't stay." I not gon' have no teenagers making no baby.

There are so many kids that don't make 17. Look at that 16-year-old boy that got killed last week. Somebody was looking for his cousin. All this kinda stuff, it don't make sense. These kids can't even make 17. All over drugs. Drugs taken control. Even the parents in it. How a child go come home with a \$100 sweatshirt on, \$200 sneakers. Ain't got no job. A thousand dollars in they pocket. He ain't gon' come in my house and do that. Some parents use the money. Some of the kids'll knock they own parents out. The parents afraid of the kids. I've seen 'em knock the parents the hell down.

Where does responsibility for this situation lie? As the story* of this mother, who is working hard to give her children the best possible life and raising them to be law-abiding, productive citizens, shows, individual responsibility is an important element in the lives of those of the inner city who "make it." However, the above account also graphically illustrates the environmental obstacles such people must overcome; and these problems must in large part be attributed to structural factors.

The American occupational structure is presently undergoing profound change, from manufacturing to service and high tech, at the same time that our economy is becoming increasingly global. Over the past decade, our inner-city areas have suffered from active disinvestment by major corporations and by the federal government. As a result, great numbers of jobs have left the inner city for the suburbs, for non-metropolitan America, and for third-

world countries where labor is cheaper. A great many people, particularly poor blacks, are not making an effective adjustment to this change. At the same time, the very social programs that once aided so many inner-city poor people and gave many young people hope for the future have been slashed. Schools in the inner city have been allowed to deteriorate to the point that they are not educating poor black children to function in today's world. Social breakdown is the result. For some of the most desperate people, the underground economy of drugs, vice, and crime picks up the slack. The resulting poverty becomes persistent and is best described as structural. In these circumstances, it is difficult to "blame the victim."

Moreover, our society faces the powerful legacy of racial apartheid. Racial discrimination in employment for so many inner-city black people continues to be a very significant problem. Even though we have made progress through various remedial efforts, this progress has largely benefited the black middle classes. Even a cursory inspection of so many businesses, particularly small businesses, shows a startling absence of black workers, especially in managerial positions. A great many well-qualified black workers are stuck in entry level jobs with little hope of promotion to positions often reserved for whites or other non-African Americans. Many people who have not had to deal with this problem find it difficult to empathize with those who do. But this situation is replicated thousands of times throughout the land and indirectly fuels alienation among blacks.

This racial exclusion, compounded by centuries of indifference, brings about a great sense of despair, hopelessness, and anti-social behavior in inner-city communities. There exists a profound connection between such behavior and the glorification of sex, violence, and materialism in the wider society. Inner-city residents watch the same television shows and commercials as everyone else and are quick to pick up on media images. Many young people are particularly alert to the association made between material possessions as an indication of personal well-being and instances of disregard of the law in an attempt to "get over" on the system. When youthful drug dealers and other hustlers in the inner city see high public officials and corporate executives indicted for malfeasance, it often confirms a generalized belief that "everybody's doing it" and it's the careless ones or the stupid ones or simply the unlucky ones that get caught.

I would say that as a result of these various changes—which in some quarters amount to social upheaval—a strong vein of cynicism has appeared running through society. Many middle-class people, including experienced corporate executives, are finding themselves unemployed and perhaps unemployable. There emerges a persistent if often erroneous sense that everyone—corporations, workers, and hoodlums—is out for himself. "Do what you can do with what you've got" can seem to be the motto of the day. When corporations

* A field note which will appear in Dr. Anderson's forthcoming work, the lead chapter of a book on violence in the inner city, supported by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.—Ed.

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“downsize,” their concern is often with the bottom line, not always with the ethics of depriving families of their livelihood. Young people in both middle-class suburbs and the inner city easily see that these businesses are mainly responsible to themselves and not to their workers. Drug dealers too are concerned with the bottom line and not with the ethics of their trade. And much too often a moral connection between the two enterprises can be made.

To deal with the social problems the mother above points to, we might begin by making a frontal assault on the inequities of the occupational structure by making it more receptive to those who are presently frozen out. But we must also begin to think of inner-city youth as worthy of a serious investment

of our resources. We must commit ourselves to seriously upgrading inner-city schools, including relevant job training, so as to give young people a stake in the system. Moreover, we need to create opportunities for independent income, not simply because it is the morally right thing to do but because we all have a stake in a peaceful and just society.

The failure to provide productive, legitimate places for inner-city young people in the American world of work is sending the message to impoverished black youths that they must fend for themselves any way they can. And that is exactly what too many are doing with the very limited resources at their disposal. In the environment which societal neglect has created in destitute urban com-

munities, personal responsibility is too often construed as “making it”—which in many cases simply means staying alive—on one’s own. For the most desperate, the means one must employ—whether dealing drugs, pimping, holding people up, or hustling in some other way—are often secondary to the primary goal of survival. The notion of personal responsibility outside the context of actual socioeconomic conditions is an academic consideration. We may not be able to legislate a sense of responsibility, but we can pass laws to correct economic inequities. The best way to disseminate middle-class morality is to enable more people to live a decent life.

Thomas Dunfee: *Differing Visions of Responsibility*

The subject of this symposium—constructing responsibility—is eminently appropriate for the occasion, the institution, and the times. Issues of responsibility within the University and the surrounding community will surely be an important agenda item for our new administration. A challenge that I am confident will be met creatively and forcefully.

More broadly, attitudes toward personal responsibility permeate the national discourse on the major issues of our time: crime, health care, welfare reform, and the fairness and efficiency of our legal system. In my area of experience—the world of business—the issue hits with significant force. At the crossroads of economic activity and responsibility we find very complex issues. For example: To what extent is the economic system a contributor to feelings of hopelessness which may help explain individual failures to accept personal responsibility? On the other hand, to what extent does a wide-spread failure of personal responsibility lead to systemic economic failure? To put it bluntly, can the irresponsible behavior of some in a given society result in that society becoming poorer than it might otherwise be? Which in turn can lead to a vicious cycle of more poverty, less responsibility, even more poverty, and so on.

For me, the connection between values and societal wealth was highlighted at a conference on “Business Ethics in the New Russia” held in Moscow during the summer of 1993. There, in the raucous environment of sweeping political change, leavened by rapidly emerging cowboy capitalism, conference participants discussed the role of a strong moral fabric in open economic systems. Speakers stressed that the architect’s blueprint for the physical structure of capitalism—with its emphasis on private property ownership, efficient capital and consumer markets, fluid labor and open international trade—fails to stipulate a (if not the) critical specification for viable capitalism, the need for self-restraint, responsibility, honesty and integrity among the participants.

The case for encouraging more responsibility in business and, indeed, in all dimensions of society seems overwhelming. But whenever we start trying to define what is

meant by responsible behavior, the consensus begins to evaporate. Instead we discover there are many different visions of responsibility. We quickly learn that before one can, in the words of the symposium panel topic, “construct” responsibility; one must “understand” responsibility. Any attempt to understand responsibility quickly leads to a virtual blizzard of difficult questions.

How do societal attitudes about responsibility come into being and evolve? What are the cultural implications of notions of responsibility? What impact do attitudes about responsibility have on the ability of a society to generate wealth or on the quality of life within its communities?

More specifically within the world of business, questions arise such as: what does it mean to be responsible, particularly when decisions involve trade-offs? Is it appropriate for Merck to spend large sums of money over many years to develop a drug responsive to river blindness which afflicts millions of people in the third world, when it may mean that Merck spends less on AIDS or prostate cancer research? Is it appropriate for McDonald’s to sell coffee significantly hotter than the temperature at which coffee is regularly sold? Is there such a thing as organizational responsibility? Does it make sense to think of corporate entities such as Merck and McDonald’s as “responsible” or “irresponsible” or should such declarations be limited to the individual managers who made the decisions at issue?

In attempting to answer the ultimate question of what constitutes appropriate responsibility, we should be very careful about the conclusions that we draw from highly publicized public events, particularly those associated with the legal system. Consider several recent law cases.

A hung jury fails to convict the Menendez brothers in part because of a defense based upon sexual abuse. Lorena Bobbitt is acquitted of mutilating her husband. Those accused of assaulting Reginald Denny are acquitted in a charged political atmosphere. Mrs. Liebeck initially recovers \$2.9 million from McDonald’s after she spills hot coffee on herself. Columnists bewail these outcomes as accept-

ing “victimization defenses” which deny or weaken norms of personal responsibility.

But these decisions may not be the proper place to look for societal definitions of responsibility. Ethics, properly viewed, goes beyond the law. The legal system, by its nature cannot be an efficient arbiter of moral responsibility. For example, the jury verdicts in the Menendez, Bobbitt and Denny cases were rendered within the context of the criminal justice system. A fundamental principle of that system is to make sure that the number of innocent people convicted of crimes remains reasonably low. To achieve this goal, the system employs a presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt rule. The criminal justice system is not intended to draw a bright line of personal responsibility or to reflect extant social norms of personal responsibility. Treating criminal jury verdicts as reflective of proper norms of social behavior is entirely inappropriate. Instead, the verdicts must be assessed in the context of the broader goals of the criminal justice system. Under this view, the conclusion drawn by the Henny Penny “the sky is falling” columnists are misleading, even harmful if some accept the idea that these decisions are valid barometers of societal attitudes about responsibility.

What about the McDonald’s case I mentioned, which is not a criminal case, but instead a product liability case? As you probably are aware, Mrs. Liebeck bought a hot (it was 180 degrees) cup of coffee (for 49 cents—whatever happened to the nickel cup of coffee?) at the drive-in window of a McDonald’s in Albuquerque. She spilled it on herself when she tried to add cream and sugar and she suffered third degree burns. Although the jury found Mrs. Liebeck 20% responsible for her own injuries it was apparently incensed at the lack of “responsibility” on the part of McDonald’s and it awarded her \$2.9 million with most of the sum representing punitive damages designed to make an example of McDonald’s. An appellate court subsequently lowered the award to \$480,000.

The decision appears to send a directly contradictory message. One recovers a fortune in spite of overt personal irresponsibility, the recovery based on punishing a firm for its lack of responsibility. It appears to be a double-standard, a downplaying of personal respon-

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sibility for individuals while imposing high standards of responsibility on organizations. It may also have an impact more generally on individual choice in our society.

The impact of such a judgment based upon McDonald's "irresponsibility" may be to bring about a change in the temperature at which coffee is sold. McDonald's sells about 1 billion cups of coffee a year, presumably to buyers who want hot coffee. Consumer choice becomes limited because of the definition of responsibility imposed in the case. From the general reaction to the verdict, it appears to be the shared convictions of U.S. citizens that recovery of such a large amount in this context is highly inappropriate.

There is a third reason why we should be careful about drawing conclusions about the nature of responsibility from dramatic verdicts. To do so is to imply a particular conception of responsibility—one based on the idea that responsibility is imposed on people in a top-down manner, through ever tougher criminal laws, imposition of civil liability and more rigorous enforcement mechanisms. In contrast to the command and control approach of "we can coerce responsibility" is the idea that important dimensions of responsibility come from the bottom up, as the product of shared values and attitudes, encouraged and

supported by members of a community. In this shared values view, citizens set standards for responsible behavior through unwritten, informal social contracts. These standards are generally understood and actively supported by most members of the community. They are enforced by reputation effects and other informal means. They constantly evolve in response to changing contexts. Most importantly, they are rarely imposed from above.

This raises the important and difficult question of whether responsibility can be taught in any particular context. When you hear this question, you probably first think about professional schools, and elementary and secondary education. I would like to briefly mention another context—responsibility programs within corporations. The distinction between the "command and control" versus the "shared values" approach is also reflected today in the types of ethics programs developed by corporations. Some firms emphasize compliance programs, often developed and implemented by lawyers based upon standards extracted externally from the criminal and administrative law. In dramatic contrast are the many firms who have developed so-called integrity programs which emphasize the company's own traditions and values, which in turn incorporate broader societal obligations. The integrity programs

typically involve a wide range of managers and professionals. Their objective is to achieve an environment in which employees have accepted the organizational values as their own, in part, because they have had a real say in the identification of those values.

What conclusions are to be drawn from these few examples?

First, that context is always important in trying to define responsibility.

Second, that an informal social contract may be as important in determining responsibility as more formal institutionalized standards of social control.

Third, and most important, in seeking to identify proper standards of responsibility, the shared convictions of members of the affected communities should always be considered an important source of guidance.

Most of these questions about the fundamental nature of responsibility remain unresolved, illusive challenges. More research is needed. Good quality, interdisciplinary research. The University of Pennsylvania has great resources, spread across many academic fields, which can help us to understand and encourage personal responsibility. We must stimulate and support those resources to enable Penn to continue as a leading contributor to the debates about personal and organizational responsibility.

Renée Fox: *The Individual and the Communal*

In my view, the ways in which the concept and issue of personal responsibility are currently being invoked in many spheres of American life is a present-day manifestation of a theme and a problem that have pervaded our society and culture from their inception.

In the 1830s, the French social philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville wrote a book entitled *Democracy in America*, based on his first-hand observation in the United States—then a new nation—and his wide conversations with the Americans whom he met. This book is still one of the most astute and penetrating analyses of the relationship between character and society in America that has ever been set forth. The central phenomenon around which Tocqueville's book turns is American individualism, which in the words of the contemporary sociologist Robert N. Bellah, he described "with a mixture of admiration and anxiety."

Tocqueville was concerned about how the strong individualistic thrust of our Protestant and our democratic traditions (combined with our emphasis on equality) posed serious challenges to our conception of community and our concrete realization of it. He identified certain mores and institutions (which he sometimes collectively referred to as "habits of the heart"), that he felt joined our highly autonomous notion of the individuality of persons with a sense of the common good and of community in a manner that enabled us to articulate and achieve shared social goals. Our family life, our religious traditions, and our creation of voluntary associations in which we actively participated (Tocqueville spoke of us as "a nation of joiners") were the integrating configurations that he singled out. He was impressed by their

American attributes and their strength. But he was also worried that our kind of individualism and its paramountcy might progressively erode and supersede their influence. The result, he feared, might be a "culture of separation" that not only isolated Americans from one another, but could jeopardize the conditions of freedom on which this country was founded.

I hear that tension between the individual and the communal in the awkward, ambivalent and highly moralistic discussions about personal responsibility that are currently taking place on the American scene. On the one hand, we seem to be acknowledging that we are having trouble in many arenas of our national existence with matters that call for social solidarity and a sense of societal community that transcend self-interest and particularism. On the other hand, we are exhorting people to deal with, contribute to, and remedy these matters in a personally individualistic way—as though the social and communal aspects of our collective life involved no more than the sum of its individual parts.

Such a perspective assumes that if every member of the society were to do his or her "own thing," and it was the proper and so-called "responsible thing," the well-being and betterment of the society would be served. Underlying this outlook is an atomistic conception of responsibility: the belief that each and all of us are free and able to do what is required for others as well as ourselves; and a set of simplified ideas about the relationship between individuals, groups, and the larger society.

As I see it, "responsibility" has become a *leitmotif* of the 1990s, partly as a reaction to the neo-individualism that crested in our

society during the 1980s (some of you may remember the Blue Cross/Blue Shield advertisement that enjoined us to "Take good care of yourself—you belong to you").

This is a form of American individualism—much more dissociated from a sense of the common good and of community than in Tocqueville's time—that underscores these principles of individual rights, autonomy, self-determination, and their legal expression in the jurisprudential notion of privacy. It is integrally connected, too, with the kind of free enterprise, market-oriented, supply-side economics keynoted by the Reagan and Bush presidential administrations. It even penetrates fields like bioethics, where individualism, autonomy and self-determination trump all other values. Beneficence—being sure to do no more harm than good—and justice are emphasized; but caring, compassion and love, responsibility, obligation and duty are played down.

Ostensibly, our growing insistence on responsibility stands in contrast to the individual rights emphasis of the 1980s. However, we have not broken through the vise of our individualism. It is notable that the responsibility for which we are presently calling is *personal* rather than collective.

It is also important to recognize how distinctly Western, and uniquely American, our conception of the individuality of the person is. Most non-Western societies and cultures of the world (be they Asian, African, or Middle Eastern), have a more relational conception of the human persons and personhood, that is inseparable from connectedness to designated, significant others, and from certain forms of social solidarity. Within a comparative, global framework, the American notion of the au-

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onomous, self-determining self is the most individualistic sort of individualism of all. I have recently taken part in a meeting on social science and medicine held in Hungary, in which members of 43 countries participated. I was struck by the fact that the Americans (and also the English) domineeringly insisted on the individuality of human rights. This contrasted sharply with what I heard a Nigerian

psychologist say about loyalty to the clan as a family virtue, expected because the clan is the source of identity. "I am because we are," he said, "and because we are, therefore I am." This is a very different conception from our self-determining notion of individualism.

Alexis de Tocqueville would certainly be intrigued by the ways in which Americans are grappling with rights-and-responsibilities,

self-and-others, individual-and-community issues in 1994. But I do not think that he would be surprised. I wonder, though, what he would say about the new surge of volunteerism occurring among American high school, college and medical students, which challenges the allegation that there is widespread deficiency among young persons in assuming individual and communal responsibility. Is it so new?

Martin Seligman: *Personal Responsibility and Individual Choice*

Two controversial points:

One, individual choice and personal responsibility have unambiguous benefits for human beings and this is, at base, a fact of nature and not a social construction.

Two, one of the main deep obstacles to personal responsibility is widespread belief in the theories professed by some of my esteemed colleagues—theories of victimology.

Most psychologists are not comfortable with the notion of responsibility—it is, after all, a legal and a fuzzy term. We are more at home with an underlying notion—individual control—better defined and rooted in scientific psychology.

A person has "control" over an outcome if some voluntary action in the person's repertoire can change the outcome. A person is "helpless" if no voluntary action in the person's repertoire controls the outcome.

The consequences of having control versus being helpless are well-studied: the subject of more than a hundred doctoral dissertations and more than a thousand journal articles in the last thirty years. Both our new president, Judy Rodin, and I have contributed to this weighty literature.

Having control and knowing you have control (very close to the sense of being responsible) has three well-documented benefits for people:

- a) It fights depression;
- b) It produces more achievement in school, work, and sports; and
- c) It results in better physical health.

Conversely, being helpless produces more depression, less achievement, and worse physical health. All of these benefits may stem from one basic benefit—not having control, being helpless, produces passivity and giving up. Having control energizes voluntary action.

When Tom Dunfee asked the question today, "Will there be an association between diminished personal responsibility and diminished economic power," from a psychologist's point of view the answer would have to be an overwhelming "yes."

Now most (but not all) of the documentation comes from studies of people in first world cultures. So it is possible that the benefits of choice are a cultural artifact, some contingent creation of a society that glorifies individualism, of Protestant theology, of Madison Avenue—a social construction of the sort relativists and post-modernists are so fond of.

But animals (rats, dogs, primates, goldfish, even cockroaches) show the parallel benefits

of choice and the parallel costs of helplessness as do Westernized humans. They are energized by control and become passive, depressed, and suffer worse physical health when they are helpless.

Conclusion: There is a genetic anlage for personal responsibility, and for these benefits. Culture can produce rich variations upon it, and a balance of individual and collective responsibility. But at bottom evolution has enormous interest in individual control, and has selected for species and individuals that strive for such control and strive to avoid helplessness.

When bad events happen to us—helplessness, failure, rejection—we try to explain them. We have habits of explaining, explanatory styles, and the crucial two dimensions of our explanatory style are that they are either permanent or temporary, either global or specific. For example, if you flunk a test and you give the explanation, "I'm stupid," that is permanent and global; but if you say, "I didn't study hard enough," it is temporary and specific.

These habits have well-documented consequences.

Permanent and global explanations potentiate helplessness, produce despair, hopelessness and passivity: *pessimism*. Temporary and specific ones minimize helplessness and fuel efforts to change: *optimism*.

So how we think about our troubles—over and above reality—has substantial influence on the likelihood of success or failure, with belief in *permanent, unchangeable, and global* causes making further trouble more likely.

Let's look at one such explanation, from my own discipline. The recovery movement claims that we are victims of childhood trauma—adult anxiety, depression, sexual problems are caused by childhood abuse, even if we can't remember it. I do not have in this forum the time needed to explore when this explanation is actually true and when it is false and how we can tell the difference. Although I do think that childhood is vastly overrated. [Laughter.]

Rather I want to explore its form, not its content. This victim theory explains our troubles in a permanent and global way. Being a prisoner of a toxic childhood is a more permanent and pervasive explanation of being depressed or lonely as an adult than a failed love relationship, or being caught in lie, or pessimism, or serotonin level.

Victim explanations are readily adopted because they provide one psychological boon: They generally shift blame from the self to

some larger, more impersonal cause. Being lonely and depressed is our parents' fault and not because we are selfish or unkind or too proud. Such an explanation makes us feel better. It raises self-esteem, It lowers guilt and shame. But it does so at a very high price: If you believe such a theory of your troubles, it tends to be self-fulfilling. Victim explanations, because they invoke unchangeable and pervasive causes, produce more despair, more passivity, and more hopelessness. People who believe they are victims, systematically, believe they have less personal control, less choice, and are less responsible for what they have done. Such a view of yourself will, by its form, produce more depression, less achievement, and chill attempts to change.

There are a whole array of fashionable theories and ideologies which urge groups of Americans to see themselves as victims. It has become an academic commonplace to say that the perpetrators of crime are victims of poverty (ignoring the low crime rate in Calcutta). Other popular theories urge us to see ourselves as victims of racism and sexism. Victimology has become a legal industry and people now literally get away with murder. The Menendez brothers' carefully planned murder of their parents is excused because they claimed they were victims of sexual abuse. I do not have the expertise to say if these theories are true or false. But the form of these explanations troubles me. They shift blame away from the self and toward the less changeable and the more global. Such structural explanations, by their form, increase despair and passivity, and erode personal responsibility.

To the extent you believe the theory that your troubles come from your childhood, your race, your sex, there is simply less room for personal responsibility.

Historians analyzing the rise of American power often emphasize America's vast natural resources: two fortress oceans protecting it from foreign trespass. Purple mountains, amber waves of grain. Alabaster cities. But rarely mentioned are the psychological resources of its people. A people who believed that what others saw as unattainable could be attained. A nation of immigrants who believed in—and who were willing to die for—a set of ideals, for freedom, for individualism and for equality.

A nation of optimists. And it is this psychological strength, what I believe is our nation's most precious resource, that hangs in the balance today.

discussion: next pages

Discussion

Arthur Caplan: Well, it now falls to me to try and extract some basis of discussion from this sea of unanimity. *[Laughter.]*

I was going to lead off with a question that occurred to me as I was listening to these presentations, to see if the panel wanted to engage the question and use it as a vehicle for what I hope will be an opportunity to engage each other in some of their remarks as well. Let me put it to you pretty simply; it's an old Socratic, a very *good* and old Socratic, question. Professor Seligman was talking about it at the end. We heard about it, in fact, in themes from the other speakers.

Can responsibility be taught?

One way of responding to some of what we've heard from our panelists today is that we need to break away from simplistic conceptions of victimology and blaming the victim. We have to, in some ways, engage what we know to be true about the human spirit and what might be beneficial for it.

But is it as simple a matter as my old football coach used to say, "Just take charge of yourself, Art"? (I'd come back whining and complaining that I kept getting knocked backwards by the defensive tackle playing opposite me and he said it was just a matter of "responsibility—exercise more of it.")

Well, is it that simple? I put it to the panel: Let's say that it's a complex matter of where responsibility comes from. But if we're teaching it at a business school or engaged with dialogues with other cultures, how do we, in a way, inculcate this sense? Or, is it simply a matter of doing what Professor Anderson said, "Let's get everyone a job and responsibility will flow?" I didn't mean to be so simplistic about it, but to put cards on the table. Anyone want to go to the plate?

Dr. Fox: Well, I don't want to go to the plate necessarily... *[Dr. Caplan: Heavy sports metaphors all of a sudden.]* ...but I was thinking: I know that Professor Seligman intended to take an extreme position in order to provoke responses—perhaps particularly from the social scientists on the panel. Clearly, if we take him literally—which he certainly does not intend us to—it would leave no room for any kind of social, cultural, or situational explanation.

It also occurred to me as I listened to what he had to say, that in our society and culture we tend to define things in dichotomies, with the result that we often lock ourselves into the position of having to choose between what we formulate as irreconcilable dichotomies. We have a lot of trouble with the middle ground. And so we grapple with the issues under discussion today as though we were dealing with two sets of antithetic notions—as if we had to choose between individualism and community, or between personal and social responsibility.

Professor Seligman has characterized what he calls more "permanent" explanations of some of the predicaments he has identified as inherently self-defeating. I wonder whether that is true of "spiritual" explanations (Arthur Caplan is the only one who has used the word "spiritual" from the platform today). When it comes to some of the ponderable imponderables, some of the great questions of meaning

that Professor Seligman invoked ("Why has this misfortune befallen me? Why do suffering and evil, inequity and injustice exist in our individual and collective lives? Where do we come from and where are we going? What is death and why are we mortal?") there are what could be termed "permanent" responses in all the religious traditions of the world. These religious ways of addressing questions of meaning can be liberating, without definitively explaining them—because such problems of meaning don't have facile explanations. God doesn't lean down out of heaven in any religious tradition and give simple answers to them. But I cite religious explanations to affirm that I don't think all "permanent" explanations and "solutions" are as incapacitating a Professor Seligman has implied.

Dr. Dunfee: I'll return to Art Caplan's question, as to whether or not ethics can be taught, in the context of a professional program where you are attempting to reach students when they're 28 to 30 years old.

There are two objections or questions that are regularly raised.

The first is, is it appropriate? Is it appropriate to try to encourage a particular view of responsibility or to teach values, as some suggest occurs? And the second is, even if we think that that is appropriate, isn't it too late? They're 28 years old; they've already had the full range of life's experiences and so on.

In regard to the first, there's an interesting study that was recently done at Cornell by an economist by the name of Robert Frank, where they studied students taking an economics course and they had them engage in cooperation games beforehand—games where if everybody cooperates there is the maximum outcome, but if one person defects and everybody else cooperates, the defector then is the big winner. And they discovered a rather interesting thing: that after taking economics, students are more likely to defect in cooperation games. *[Laughter.]*

I would suggest that there are some values being taught in that course, because the models are very much of egoistic managers, non-altruistic, they don't have any other dimension to them. So, one thing that occurs in the kinds of courses that we do is to provide a counterpoint in literature so that at least the students have a fuller understanding of this area.

The second thing is that if you came into the classroom, you would discover that we discuss issues relating to professional kinds of relationships where students clearly hadn't thought about it before; that there is, in a sense, an artifactual aspect of business. Business is something that's man-made so that however you're hardwired as a human being it doesn't give you a sense of what's the right thing necessarily to do when you're confronted with a question ("Are you going to make a payment to sell a particular product in Indonesia?"). There are some reasoned approaches to considering what should be done, and for students to discuss it and learn from their peers. I think that there is a value that comes from that.

Dr. Caplan: I'm going to turn to Martin next, but I wanted to put on the table as a parallel to this issue of the classroom: does

it make any sense for a Louis Sullivan or the President to exhort us to be responsible in the face of certain forms of crime or social problems or challenges that clearly outrage us?

I mean, a number of our politicians are now taking it upon themselves to say, "Be responsible. We must restore a sense of personal responsibilities." Is that kind of national teaching of any value? And I didn't mean to throw that just to you, Martin, but keep it in the background as you think about what we might do if we wanted to inculcate this sense of responsibility or try to turn the dial up on that.

Dr. Seligman: Well, that was just the question I was going to answer. *[Laughter.]*

Dr. Caplan: I knew that. *[More laughter.]*

Dr. Seligman: I think it makes a great deal of sense for our leaders to urge us to learn responsibility, to learn control. Let me just give one instance of it. I think, unlike many personality characteristics, it's learnable; it can change. There's an epidemic of psychological depression in the United States today. Looking out in this room, mean age looks to me to be about 50, maybe even 55. Your children are 10 times more likely to have a serious episode of depression in their lifetime than you were.

It's an alarming fact. It's an alarming fact about Penn freshmen. It's an alarming fact about 10- 12-year-old children.

Now, our group believes that depression is related to the belief that your troubles have permanent, unchangeable, global causes. So, we've been engaged in two studies to change this.

In one, we take one quarter of Penn's freshman class—we've done this for the last three years; we take the most pessimistic quartile—and we put them through a workshop in which they learn to recognize the thoughts they had when bad events happened to them—their permanence, their unchangeability—and they learned to dispute these thoughts. This is a modification for normal people of what Tim Beck* calls "cognitive therapy."

We've been able to lower the rate of depression as we follow these students over the next three years, and their physical health has increased as well. We've also, Art, done the same thing with 10- 12-year-old children in the public schools around Philadelphia—we just reduced the intervention down to the 10- 12-year-old level. And there, because I think we've picked a critical time of life when the theories of responsibility, of control, of helplessness are forming, we found a 100% change over the next two years in the symptoms of depression.

So, I do believe a sense of control, personal responsibility, and fighting helplessness can be taught.

Dr. Caplan: I want to ask another question about responsibility, and this would let Drew come into the conversation as well if she chooses, although this may be terrain

* Dr. Aaron T. Beck, University Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry and director of the Center for Cognitive Therapy.—Ed.

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where it's getting dangerous to tread. I was listening to the economic, the sociological, the psychological, the anthropological aspects of responsibility, and trying to understand that it is a much more complicated concept in terms of both how one goes about understanding it—either as biological or social construction, or economically shaped. I couldn't help but wonder, as we come to the end of this century, realizing that of three figures that loom large in the intellectual life of this century—Darwin, Marx, and Freud (one of them seemingly in disrepute and one about to be forgotten, but I won't identify which is which [laughter]; one doing pretty well, it looks like from recent book sales)—I couldn't help but wonder:

Did we kill responsibility? Did we undermine the myths and the imagery and the sense of self determination and control by chipping away, by trying to understand it, by pulling it apart in so many ways?

In other words, is it ironically the case that the more we know, the less the spiritual, the religious, the philosophical presuppositions of a Hobbes or one of the Scottish moralists or one of the Christian thinkers stands up to the analysis that we bring to bear? Are we in some ways responsible for undermining what we used to think about responsibility, about our ability to, if you will, control things, about our ability to hold ourselves to account?

If the psychologist enters the court room and gives the explanation, or the anthropologist comes and says, "Look, there are many different ways to see this; not just one," do we chip away at that? Are we in any way guilty for undermining this concept? You can all fess up now...

Dr. Faust: From the beginning, I insisted I am only a facilitator—but if you get me started, I have quite an assortment of thoughts and reactions.

One thing that strikes me about this question—I'm not sure I understand entirely what you're asking, but if I relate it back to what Marty was saying earlier—is that our notions today of "control" of our lives would be seen as so presumptuous in a world in which God had control. People in the 19th century often believed that their children were taken away from them by God because they had come to love their children too much, and this was to presume that they had a right to these children, and that God would punish them by killing the child with some terrible disease.

So, I think that the notion of control is very historically bound, and one that is very much a product of our times; and that control in previous centuries was often seen as only God's right. And this makes me wonder, "Were all these people depressed?" [Laughter.] You said your research had involved only animals and first world subjects, and obviously you couldn't do your experiments with people from past times, but I wondered how your theories would operate in these culturally very different times and places?

If I could just add one other question that I have: it seems that you resist, Marty, the notion of constructing responsibility; and yet, it seems to me you're very committed to the idea of constructing optimism—because if you place

someone in Eli's situation, optimism may not be what's called for. I mean, that mother's going to need a lot of luck; she's tried very hard to "construct optimism" in that situation, construct a plan and action to feel she has control over her child—but it seems to me there are certain contexts where optimism is uncalled-for. And what happens to it then? If you feel guilty because you have a disease which is going to kill you, and you can't figure out how your responsibility and control operate within that context, what happens in those situations?

It seems to me you've denied the reality of bad things or bad situations, as Eli would've had them, by putting so much emphasis on the obligation of the individual to be optimistic in order to find a way out. Sometimes, I would guess, there just isn't a way out.

Dr. Caplan: So, in a sense now, we've got the question of: Did the Kogod Professor kill God [laughter] and is there too much of a sense of being able to construct and manipulate these variables to inculcate this sense of responsibility, and, precisely the point that I was trying to drive at too with my sports question: In a hopeless situation, are we forcing ourselves in some ways? Can we break away from these realities?

Dr. Fox: Although it sounds as if we are talking about something other than individual rights, it seems to me that in the way we are framing the notion of personal responsibility, we are still primarily referring to what the *individual* does. We are not discussing, for example, the kinds of situations to which Drew has drawn our attention, in which social indignation is more appropriate than individual optimism.

The dynamic equilibrium between rights and responsibilities in our society appears to have gone awry. We have come to place so much emphasis on individual rights, that we now speak of the self-determined and self-determining individual, as though it were conceivable that any of us were that self-created, autonomous, or disconnected from significant others.

What has happened to the relationship between our individual rights, and our social solidarity, our relationship to one another, and what is we need to do together, on behalf of each other, if we are to have a societal community?

If you push the notion of individual control and responsibility for individual control to the extreme, you end up, once again, in the box of our very peculiar conception of individualism, that is not only Western, but idiosyncratically American. Compared to how fellow European or sister European countries would conceive of their traditions of individualism, it is precisely what Tocqueville worried about when he visited the United States in the early 19th century—but a worse-scenario form of it, I think, than what he envisioned.

Dr. Seligman: Drew puts her finger, I think, on the most troublesome aspect of the notion of control.

There are three benefits, Drew; there are three things that nondepressed people (people who feel they have control) do better than de-

pressed people: in general, they have tools for fighting depression, they achieve more, and their physical health is probably better.

But there's one thing that depressed and pessimistic people do better than nondepressed people, and that is they're right. [Laughter.]

Starting at Penn about 15 years ago, Lauren Alloy and Lyn Abramson began to ask the question, "Who appreciates reality better, optimists or pessimists, depressed or nondepressed people?" And what they found, systematically—it's a finding that won't go away; it's the most annoying finding of my scientific career—is that depressed people are accurate and non-depressed people systematically distort the world in the direction of their own control. If you want to make money in the stock market, you should get a depressed friend to invest for you. [Laughter.]

So when I first set out as a psychotherapist, 20-25 years ago, I thought that I was going to be agent of both truth and happiness, but I think these are antagonistic [laughter]. All the virtues don't go in one direction here, and one of the most poignant problems is the titration between wisdom and compassion, on the one hand, and achievement, good health, fighting depression, on the other hand.

I don't have an easy answer for it. It's an excellent question.

My other comment had to do with the construction of these notions. I tried to argue today that, at base, both the notion of control and the notion of optimism have deep evolutionary, biological underpinnings; that they are constructed, but only in the elaboration sense; that, I believe, our society—a society—can believe in control exerted by God or control in the hands of the collective. And I think now we've come to the end of this century in which the notion of control in our society now means individual control. So, I think there's a constructive overlay on a deeply biological process.

Dr. Caplan: One of the responsibilities that I have is to make sure that we end in a timely fashion. The fact is that some of our panelists have been calling upon us to think about responsibility a bit differently—think about it as something that might apply to persons in relationships, something that communities can foster; and I find myself resonating to that call simply because we're about to engage over the next two days an example of that; we are going to be engaged in that communal celebration. We are going to be talking quite a bit over the next 24 hours about responsibility both individual and institutional, and I think we are probably going to learn a great deal about where this community is headed in terms of its outlook and vision, in terms of inculcating both rights and responsibilities among its members.

I hope today that what you take away from our discussion is the recognition that there is much to be said about responsibility by scholars, by experts, that has not shaped the debate thus far in this culture. But I think, though, that we've made a small start today toward trying to rectify what I think is a problem that demands solutions.

Thank you.